Silicon Valley has tried to distance itself from the controversial U.S. surveillance programs exposed by Edward Snowden, but there is a long history of close cooperation between technology companies and the intelligence community.
　　矽谷試圖拉開與斯諾登所披露的美國監控專案的距離，但是科技企業與情報機構之間的緊密合作由來已久。

　　Former U.S. officials and intelligence sources say the collaboration between the tech industry and spy agencies is both broader and deeper than most people realize, dating back to the formative years of Silicon Valley itself.
　　前美國官員和情報消息人士稱，科技行業和情報機構間的合作比大多數人認識到的更加廣泛和深入，並且能追溯到矽谷成立的年代。

　　As U.S. intelligence agencies accelerate efforts to acquire new technology and fund research on cybersecurity, they have invested in start-up companies, encouraged firms to put more military and intelligence veterans on company boards, and nurtured a broad network of personal relationships with top technology executives.
　　美國情報機構加大獲取新技術的努力，並為網路安全研究提供資金，他們投資了創業企業，鼓勵企業任命更多退伍兵和前情報人員進入董事會，並與大型科技企業高管建立了廣泛的個人關係網絡。
　　And they are using those connections to carry out specific espionage missions, current and former officials say, even as they work with the tech industry to avoid overt cooperation that might raise the hackles of foreign customers.
　　官員們稱，情報機構利用這些關係開展間諜任務，同時與科技行業共同努力避免合作招致外國客戶的憤怒。

　　Joel Harding, an intelligence officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1990s who went on to work at big defense contractors Computer Sciences Corp and SAIC, said spy agencies have at times persuaded companies to alter their hardware and software products to enable monitoring of foreign targets.
　　 Joel Harding 在20世紀90年代是美國參謀長聯席會議的一名情報人員，後來前往大型國防承包商和 SAIC 工作。 Harding 指出，情報機構有時能說服企業更改他們的硬體和軟體產品，從而對外國目標進行監控。
　　In one instance several years ago, an intelligence agency paid a tech company supervisor $50,000 to install tampered computer chips in machines bound for a customer in a foreign country so that they could be used for espionage, Harding said, declining to provide specifics. "They looked exactly the same, but they changed the chips," he said.
　　 Harding 稱，幾年前，一家情報機構向一家科技企業的主管支付了5萬美元，在賣給一個外國客戶的機器中安裝修改過的電腦晶片，從而進行間諜活動。“那些機器看起來和原來一模一樣，但是晶片被更換。”

　　A current U.S. intelligence operative, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the government often works through third parties, in part to shield the big tech companies from fallout if the operations are discovered.
　　一名現役美國情報人員匿名稱，政府經常通過協力廠商操作，部分原因是一旦行動敗露，能夠防止大型科技企業受到衝擊。
　　He cited a case more than a decade ago in which the government secretly created a computer reselling company to sell laptops to Asian governments. The reseller bought laptops from a company called Tadpole Computer, which made machines based on Sun Microsystems processors. The reseller added secret software that allowed intelligence analysts to access the machines remotely.
　　他提到了10多年前的一件事，政府秘密創建了一家轉售電腦的企業，向亞洲政府銷售筆記型電腦。該企業從一家名叫 Tadpole Computer 的企業購買筆記本， Tadpole 生產的筆記本基於 Sun Microsystems 處理器。這家轉售電腦的企業安裝了秘密軟體，使情報人員可以遠端登入這些機器。
　　Tadpole was later bought by defense contractor General Dynamics Corp in 2005. General Dynamics declined to comment. Sun's new owner, Oracle Corp, did not respond to an inquiry.
　　 Tadpole 於 2005 年被國防承包商 General Dynamics Corp 收購，而 Sun 則被甲骨文公司收購。 General Dynamics 和甲骨文都拒絕置評。

　　Despite these secret collaborations, former intelligence officials and company executives say the great fear of overseas customers — that widely used U.S. technology products contain a "back door" accessible only to the National Security Agency or Central Intelligence Agency - is exaggerated. They said computers and communications overseas are captured by other means, including third parties such as the laptop reseller and special software developed by the agencies.
　　前情報官員和公司高管們稱，雖然有這些秘密合作，但海外客戶對美國科技產品包含只有美國國家安全局或美國中央情報局能夠使用的“後門”的擔憂是誇大的。他們表示，入侵電腦和海外通信是通過其他方法，包括上述筆記型電腦轉售商等協力廠商機構和情報機構開發的特殊軟體等。
　　Defense contractors offer the government the means to break in to the products of virtually every major software vendor, according to a product catalogue reviewed by Reuters that was described as typical for the industry. The NSA did not respond to a request for comment.
　　路透社獲得的一個被稱為行業典型的產品目錄顯示，國防承包商向政府提供破解幾乎所有主流軟體提供商產品的方法。美國國家安全局拒絕置評。

　　More massive cooperation is rare because big tech companies sell to many countries and have too much business at stake in markets like China to risk installing a back door that could be discovered, said one intelligence veteran who had worked for Microsoft Corp.
　　一名曾在微軟工作的前情報人員稱，更大規模的合作很少見，因為大型科技企業面向很多國家銷售，安裝可能被發現的後門會讓在中國等市場的太多業務處於危險中。

　　"Microsoft is technically a U.S. company, but it's an international conglomerate with tons of subsidiaries," he said. "It's a major part of Microsoft strategy to sell to China." A spokeswoman for the company declined to comment.
　　“微軟技術上說是一家美國公司，但其實是一家國際性企業集團，擁有很多子公司，向中國銷售是微軟戰略的一個主要部分，”該人士說道。微軟發言人拒絕置評。